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A simple OLG-model is developed, where housing is the only consumption good and saving is 
either in terms of financial assets or in terms of owner-occupied or rented dwellings. It is 
shown that, while without taxes optimal consumption plans and maximum utility are the same 
for both the tenant and the owner-occupier, conventional income taxes cause a bias in favour 
of the latter. It is argued that the consumption good approach is always advantageous for the 
owner-occupier in comparison with the investment approach, even with high interest rates 
and a high share of borrowing. However, even the investment approach does not entirely 
remove the taxation bias on the expense of the tenant, unless the latter is allowed to deduct 
total interest payments from his income. An alternative could be cash-flow taxation. It is also 
shown that the conventional investment approach is equivalent to - and therefore could be 
replaced by - a much simpler version, where instead of imputed rent imputed interest on net 















With the challenge of demographic change, the pros and cons of property ownership as 
compared to other forms of  retirement provision have become a most relevant issue. In 
Germany, as in many other countries, most  people appraise owner-occupied accommodation 
as their favourite mode of preparing for the age. Some authors claim, however, that this is 
mostly due to psychology. According to the critics, a hard-headed economic assessment 
would regularly result in favour of renting rather than buying ones domicile. Others point to 
the different taxation of rented against owner-occupied residences. In particular, while 
financial interest payments are taxed regularly, the implicit interest of housing proprietary - 
resulting from the saved rental charges - is left tax-free in most countries. On the other hand, 
there use to be also both subsidies and tax relief in the tenement market, which make the 
balance of advantages at least vague.  
 
This paper aims to shed some more light on the essential question whether or not owner-
occupied dwellings are generally advantageous compared with other capital investments. 
“General advantage” is here not meant in terms of risk, fungibility or liquidity, but refers 
solely to profitability within a perfect capital market. For example, the building societies use 
to promote their loan contracts by the slogan “property ownership is the only retirement 
provision which you can live in”. This raises the question, however, if a loan-funded house 
for the sake of owner-occupation were not better considered as a pre-drawing of consumption 
rather than saving. Apparently, issues like this should be clarified in order to design a proper 
housing taxation scheme. 
 
There is a broad literature on that issue, and also a broad international variety of taxing 




the exclusion from taxable income of the imputed net rent of  owner-occupied dwellings 
discriminate against tenants, in particular if mortgage interest is deducted. A frequently 
offered solution to the problem is the taxation of the imputed rent (Merz 1965, p. 255;Aaron 
1970, p.803).  Many contributions on the subject rest, however, on mere partial analysis or 
heuristic arguments. Others are chiefly interested in empirical results, frequently lacking a 
sophisticated theoretical base. Examinations of owner-occupied vs. rented housing within a 
more general framework of optimal consumption choice are rare. The present paper aims to 
broaden the scope into this direction.    
 
 In particular, we examine an OLG-model in the tradition of Samuelson(1958), Diamond 
(1965) , Kotlikoff (2006) and at latest Conesa/Kitao/Krueger (2007), where the individuals 
seek to optimise their lifetime consumption pattern by saving and lending. They do this either 
in terms of financial resources or by investing and disinvesting in proprietary.  The model is 
examined with and without taxes. Concerning the latter, different taxation schemes are 
considered to affect house-allocation as little as possible.  
 
2.  A Simple OLG-Model of Housing 
We assume all individuals living for three periods and having the same incomes and tastes. 
Let w = (w1;w2;w3) be the vector of wage incomes and c = (c1;c2;c3) the vector of housing 
consumption in three subsequent phases of lifetime respectively, where 1 stands for the first 
third of life, 2 for the middle phase and 3 for the retirement.  With all accommodations having 
the same quality, housing consumption c can simply be measured by the utilized square 
meters. Individuals have identical, well behaved temporal utility functions U(c1;c2;c3), which 
they seek to maximize. It is supposed that they are purely self-interested and, hence, that there 





To facilitate matters, we disregard all consumption goods other than housing. Houses and 
apartments are supposed to be durable goods, and at the current stage of analysis we also do 
not take account of depreciations. Housing consumption can be accomplished by either 
renting or buying. It is also possible to hire out part of ones proprietary. Moreover, the 
individuals can borrow from and lend money to a perfect capital market at an interest rate i, 
with q = (1+i) denoting the interest factor. Note, however, that this does not apply to the last 
section of life, because individuals will no more be alive in the following period and hence 
will neither save nor obtain any credit. Hence, in order to maximize their utility, they must 
sell their - indelible - proprietary in period 2 at the latest, in order to rent an appropriate 
apartment in period 3, maybe in a nursing home .  
 
2.1. The Tenant`s Case 
 
As a benchmark for our analysis, we take the utility which a tenant can achieve by realizing  
his optimal temporal consumption plan. Let s = (s1;s2;0) be the vector of his net savings in 
terms of money. For simplicity, we normalize the price of buying one square meter of 
accommodation to unity. Then, with r denoting the rental charge as a percentage of  the 
accommodation´s value, the tenant faces the following set of budget constraints: 
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where the  j a can be interpreted as consumption weights of the respective periods.
1 In the 
Samuelson case with  j      1 " = j a , there is no explicit time preference, and hence the 
optimisation problem results only from diminishing marginal utility of consumption in the 
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Since the terms in brackets are the same in every period j, housing consumption rises at the 
factor  1 / - j j q a a , if we assume the rental charge to be constant. In the special case 
where j      1 " = j a , optimal housing consumption rises simply at the interest rate i. 
 
2.2.The Owner-Occupier Case 
If the dwelling is occupied by the owner himself, things are slightly more complicated. Due to 
the durability of houses, if he buys e1 and e2 square meters in period 1 and 2 respectively,  his 
consumption is c1 = e1 in period 1 and c2 = e1 + e2 in period 2. Selling all his proprietary in 
period 3, he will attain an extra revenue of e1 + e2 = c2  in that period. His expenses for 
consumption in period 3 – now as a tenant – are rc3. Hence he faces the following set of 
temporal budget constraints: 
                                                 
1 By rewriting utility function (4) as  3 3 2 2 1 1 ln ln ln ln c c c U a a a + + =  it follows that time preference is 
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In equilibrium, the investment in a tenement must exactly yield the market interest rate i. 
Hence, if the investment e and the first rental yield re both accrue in the first period,
2 and if 
the propriety is sold in period 3, the equilibrium relation of the rental charge and the 
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With this inserted into (10), the maximization of utitilty function (4) with respect to 
restrictions (8) to (10) yields exactly the same solution for  c = (c1;c2;c3) as in the tenant`s case 
(see equations 5 to 7). 
 
A first conclusion from the model is, therefore, that owner occupied accommodation does not 
have a general advantage or disadvantage compared with renting ones home. Starting with the 
same set of temporal incomes and tastes, both the owner and the tenant realize the same level 
of utility, consuming exactly the same quantities of accommodation in every period of their 
lifetime. The only difference is, that the tenant saves by the way of financial investments 
while the house owner saves by investing in his proprietary. Therefore, it is also false to 
generally attribute a higher rate of time preference to the tenant as compared to the home 
owner. Accordingly, at least in a world with perfect capital markets and without taxes, their 
different decisions on retirement provision cannot be explained that way. 
 
                                                 
2 This assumption saves the symmetry of the landlord case to the owner-occupied accommodation case. It 




The following numerical example might be helpful. Assume that  ) 1 . 1 ; 0 . 1 ; 9 . 0 ( = j a  , with the 
interest factor q = 2 and hence, according to (11), r = 0.5. Then, if the vector of wages is w = 
(1;3;2), both the tenant and the owner chose the same temporal consumption pattern c, 
thereby realizing the same utility level U (see table I). Their set of financial saving s, 
however, is different. While the tenant´s optimal consumption plan implies positive amount of 
saving in periods 1 and 2, the owner takes a debt in both periods. Yet their overall 




The owner-occupier could also chose to let a part of his proprietary, as is shown in the last 
column of table I. In fact, with a rental charge according to (11), he will be indifferent 
concerning any additional investment volume in terms of tenement. He could, for instance, 
extend his borrowing to s = (-1.3;-1.5;0), thereby expanding his real estate transactions to e = 
(2.8;2.6;-4,5). This would bring him an additional  rental revenue of re = (0.5;0.7;0), but 
leaves his total utility as well as his consumption pattern unaffected. The same would apply 
for the tenant, if he should chose to take a similar – or some other – investment in a tenement 
himself.
4   
 
Hence, with the assumptions made above, there is no bias in the housing market to whatever 
mode of supplying for ones age. Accordingly, a taxation scheme on housing should ideally 
preserve this symmetry of allocation. In the sequel, it will be shown how this could be 
achieved.     
 
 
                                                 
3 Note that, in the first period, the tenant needs less income to realize the same consumption level as the owner, 
because he must only pay re1 instead of e1 for c1.  Therefore, in spite of the identical c, the sum of s and e is not 
identical for them in the respective periods. 












renting part of his 
proprietary 
consumption  c1  1.800  1.800  1.800 
consumption  c2  4.000  4.000  4.000 
consumption  c3  8.800  8.800  8.800 
savings  s1  0.1000  -0.8000  -1.3000 
savings  s2  1.2000  -0.8000  -1.5000 
savings  s3  0  0  0 
Utility level U  74.2568  74.2568  74.2568 
 
 
3. Efficient Housing Taxation  
Introducing taxation into the model, we neglect wage taxes, by simply assuming that w 
already denotes net wage incomes. Interest income is assumed to be taxed by a proportional 
income tax t which is the same in all periods. According to taxing schemes in many countries,  
private interest payments on debt are supposed to be irrelevant for taxation, however. It is 
assumed that rental receipts are taxed by the same rate as interest income. This implies that 
the relation of rental charge and the value of a dwelling must rise from r to rt, according to  
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This is of particular relevance for the tenant, who has to bear a double tax-burden: Not only a 
part of his interest receipts is taxed away, but he also faces a higher rental charge for a given 
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If, for example, the tax rate is t = 0.4, the relative rental charge rises from r = 0.5 to rt = 0.625. 
The tenant`s optimal consumption pattern then changes to c = (1.6000;3.2381;5.6991) in the 
example from table I . This is due to both the increase from r to rt and his tax payments T = 
(0;0;0.3905), which leave him with a utility of merely 33.5259 instead of formerly 74.2568 
units. Moreover, unlike in the model without taxes, it is no longer true that consumption rises 
by the factor  1 / * - j j q a a . 
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The corresponding effects on an owner-occupier`s position depend on the particular taxation 
scheme which is applied to him. In the sequel, we analyse the pure consumer-good approach 
as compared to the pure investment approach, leaving out the various intermediate solutions 
to be adopted in reality.   
 
3.1. The Consumer Good Approach 
If living in ones own house is viewed as mere consumption, it appears natural to leave it tax-
free. From that it follows, unlike the landlord`s case, that also interest on debt should not be 
allowed for in determining the tax payment. Formally, the resulting change in the budget 
constraints for the owner-occupier is equivalent to the tenant`s case (see equations 1i to 3i):   
                                                 
5 In the special case where all  1 = a consumption rises by q in period 2 and by the net interest factor 1+i(1-t) in 
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Economically, however, the owner-occupier is in tendency better off than the tenant with this 
taxation scheme (see table II below). Although he is also negatively affected by the rising 
rental fee in period 3, he can still achieve a higher level of both temporal consumption and 
maximum utility as compared with the tenant.
6 As a matter of fact, the owner-occupier does 
not pay taxes at all, because his returns from saving are only in tax-free terms of 
accommodation use instead of financial interest receipts. This advantage is the higher, the 
more he would have to save as a tenant in order to optimise his temporal consumption pattern. 
 
This is usually viewed as a discrimination of financial investments compared with investing in 
an owner-occupied dwelling. Another - and possibly  even more relevant - misallocation is, 
however, the implicit discrimination of renting compared with living in ones own house. For, 
while there is principally the option for both the tenant and the owner-occupier for additional 
financial investments, one cannot be a tenant and an owner-occupier at the same time. Hence, 
this “either-or”-decision should not at all be affected by the taxing scheme.   
 
3.2. The Investment Approach 
According to the so called investment approach, the imputed rent of an owner-occupied 
dwelling should be taxed equally to financial interest receipts. The usual proposal is for the 
taxation of the – hypothetical - rent which the owner could achieve by letting his 
                                                 
6 The results of this and the following maximization problems were mainly achieved by numerical methods. 




accommodation, minus necessary expenses of ownership, in particular mortgage debt and 
depreciation ( Goode 1960, p. 505). Neglecting depreciation and all repair and maintenance 
costs, and also leaving out all complications of assessment, the restrictions (8i) to (10i) would 
be unaltered, but the taxing formula (12i) would change to 
( )          ) 12 ( 1i s e r t T ii j j t j - + =  
At first glance, this approach appears rather reasonable. But, apparently, there are still 
fundamental differences to the taxation of a tenant. Firstly, in contrast to the tenant, the 
owner-occupier pays a tax already in period 1. Secondly, his tax payment T3 is negative, 
because no further rental receipts but only interest payments occur in that period. While these 
two effects exactly outweigh each other and hence lastly cancel out, this does not apply to the 
third and, therefore, crucial difference. For, in contrast to the tenant, the owner-occupier can 
deduct all his interest payments for housing from his taxable income, while the tenant must 
pay his private interest payments from fully taxed income, although it is used solely for 
accommodation too. This gives the owner-occupier an advantage in comparison with the 
tenant, even if the investment approach is realized. In our example from above, for instance, 
the owner-occupier realizes still both a consumption bundle c and a utility level U which is 
slightly above the maximum utility which the tenant can achieve (see table II).  
 
Only if the initial vectors w and  ) ; ; ( 3 2 1 a a a a º are such that no debt must be taken by the 
tenant for realizing his optimal consumption bundle c, the advantage of the owner-occupier 
disappears and, hence, the investment approach seems appropriate. For example, with w = 
(3;3;2) and  ) 1 . 1 ; 0 . 1 ; 9 . 0 ( º a both the renter and the owner-occupier would realize a 






















consumption  c1  1.6000  1.8000  1.7550  1.7550 
consumption  c2  3.2381  4.0000  3.1200  3.1200 
consumption  c3  5.6991  7.0400  5.4910  5.4910 
savings  s1  0.0000  -0.8000  -1.1937  -0.0969 
savings  s2  0.9762  -0.8000  -1.0550  0.8949 
savings  s3  0  0  0  0 
Utility level U  33.5259  58.0945  33.7006  33.7006 
 
The same results as with taxing imputed rent can be achieved by an alternative investment 
approach, where, instead of a hypothetical rent, an imputed interest receipt from net capital is 
taxed in the respective period. The budget constraints are still the same as (8i) to (10i), but 
now the taxing-formula changes to 
( )           ) 12 ( 1 1 - - - + + = j j j j j s s e k ti T iii  
where k denotes net capital, which is initially zero and rises by ej plus the respective net 
financial saving sj – sj-1 in each period j.  Note that no imputed rent must be assessed in this 
version of the investment approach. With this taxing scheme and the example from above 
with t = 0.4, q = 2, w = (1;3;2) and  ) 1 . 1 ; 0 . 1 ; 9 . 0 ( º a , the owner-occupier realizes the same 
consumption bundle c and the same utility level U as with the imputed rent approach (see the 
last column in table II). There remains, of course, also the same advantage compared to the 
tenant. 
 
Only from this bias in taxation it follows, that individuals with a strong preference for present 
consumption and a relatively high income in their early periods of life will prefer to buy 
rather than renting their accommodation, while the others will be indifferent. For only the 




beeing allowed to deduct total interest payments. Due to this effect, there is also a bias 
towards investing in owner-occupied dwellings on the account of other, economically 
possibly more efficient investments.   
 
It is often argued that the investment approach is advantageous for the owner-occupier as 
compared to the consumer good approach, if interest rates are high and preferences are such 
that high debt must be taken to optimise lifetime consumption. However, in the light of our 
analysis, this statement appears to be wrong. Rather the consumption good approach is 
definitely the favourable taxation scheme from the owner`s point of view. This can 
immediately be seen from the imputed interest version of the investment approach given 
above. Because the internal interest rate of the owner-occupied dwelling must be equal to the 
market interest rate, from that approach it follows that the tax burden for the owner-occupier 
is the higher, the higher is the interest rate.
7     
 
3.3. Solution I: Deduction of Interest Payments also for the Tenant 
A very simple solution of the problem would be to abandon any taxation of interest, which 
would immediately remove the bias in favour of owner-occupied vs. rented accommodation. 
Although this solution is sometimes supposed actually, we do not pursue it here in more 
detail.  Implying both a massive breakdown of tax revenues and a violation of fundamental 
principles of justness in taxation, it appears to be far away from real political options. 
 
A much easier and more realistic approach would be to adopt the investment approach to the 
owner-occupier and to make interest payments completely deductive also for the tenant. This 
would put him on par with the owner-occupier even if his optimal saving plan implies a pre-
                                                 




drawing of consumption in any period. The only change in his budget restrictions which one 
would have to make is to replace (12i) by  
          ) 12 ( 1it s T i j j - =  
which is symmetrical on positive and negative interest receipts. For example, with q = 2,  t = 
0.4, w = (1;3;2) and  ) 1 . 1 ; 0 . 1 ; 9 . 0 ( º a , we achieve the optimal consumption plans shown in 
table III, all of which yielding the same level of utility.  
Table III: Optimum consumption plans with solution I 
  Tenant, 









with taxing imputed 
interest receipts 
consumption  c1  1.7550  1.7550  1.7550 
consumption  c2  3.1201  3.1201  3.1201 
consumption  c3  5.4910  5.4910  5.4910 
savings  s1  -0.0969  -1.1937  -0.7550 
savings  s2  0.8949  -1.0550  -0.2750 
savings  s3  0  0  0 
Tax payment  T1  0  0.4387  0 
Tax payment  T2  -0.0388  0.3025  0.4000 
Tax payment  T3  0.3580  -0.4220  1.1380 
Utility level U  33.7006  33.7006  33.7006 
    
One might object that it could be difficult to separate hypothecary from other credit in 
practice. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that this would really be senseful. Why not 
pre-draw consumption by purchasing a car instead of a dwelling? In the light of our analysis, 
the only thing that counts is to treat the tenant´s interest payments the same as the owner-
occupier`s. Moreover, even in the latter´s case, it lastly cannot be controlled for which 
purpose his credits are really used. Hence, this solution appears to be both elegant and 
reasonable also from a pragmatic point of view.     






3.4. Solution II: Cash Flow Taxation  
Another option is a cash-flow tax, making all outflows deductible and all inflows taxable for 
both financial and real investments. As is well known, a cash-flow tax leaves the after-tax-rate 
of return and, hence, also the interest rate unaffected (see e.g. Katz 1999, p.5). Therefore, 
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  . 
For the tenant, a cash flow tax on his non-wage-income would mean that the taxation formula 
in his set of restrictions ((1i) to (3i) must be rewritten as follows: 
( )      ) 1 (     ) 12 ( 1 j j j s s i t T iv - + = -  
For the owner-occupier the set of restrictions is still (8ii) to (10ii), but instead of (12iii) the 
new taxation formula adopted to him is also (12iv). In other words, both the tenant and the 
owner-occupier pay taxes for every inflow of interest or reflux from former savings, while 
they get a tax credit for every interest payment or new financial saving. Note that, other than 
in the investment approaches discussed above, both house purchases e and imputed rent re are 
no longer relevant for taxation.  With the cash-flow taxing scheme and the example from the 
last section, we get the consumption patterns shown in table IV: 
 
Not surprisingly, total utility is higher than with solution I, because a cash-flow tax lastly 
means that financial receipts are not taxed at all (the present value of taxes being zero). For 
this reason, a change towards a cash-flow tax would at best be achievable in small steps, 
maybe starting with the housing sector. However, from a theoretical point of view,  this 






Table IV: Optimum consumption plans with solution II 
  Tenant, 
 with cash-flow tax on  
financial transactions 
Owner-occupier, 
with cash-flow tax on  
financial transactions 
Owner-occupier, 
without taxes on 
financial receipts at 
all  
consumption  c1  1.8000  1.8000  1.8000 
consumption  c2  4.0000  4.0000  4.0000 
consumption  c3  8.8000  8.8000  8.8000 
savings  s1  0.1667  -1.3333  -0.8000 
savings  s2  2.0000  -1.3333  -0.8000 
savings  s3  0  0  0 
Tax payment  T1  -0.0667  0.5333  0 
Tax payment  T2  -0.0667  -0.5333  0 
Tax payment  T3  1.6000  -1.0667  0 
Utility level U  74.2569  74.2569  74.2569 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks   
Within the limits of our assumptions, it has been shown that 
·  without taxes, there is no difference in either the optimal consumption pattern or the utility 
level which can be achieved concerning the rent or buy decision in housing; 
·  with a proportional income tax on wages and interest receipts, there accrues a bias in 
favour of owner-occupied dwellings as compared to renting;  
·  this bias is much greater in case of the consumption good approach, but it also exists with 
the investment approach; 
·  the consumption good approach is definitely more advantageous for the owner-occupier 
than is the investment approach, if the optimal consumption pattern is chosen;  
·  concerning the investment approach, taxing the imputed interest on net capital in each 
period would be a perfect equivalent to the conventional tax on both actual interest 




·  equal taxation of the tenant and the owner-occupier could be accomplished by either 
imposing a cash flow tax, or by applying the investment approach to the owner-occupier 
and making interest payments completely deductive also for the tenant. 
 
These results might be helpful in designing a real world taxing scheme on housing. However, 
the limits of our analysis must be regarded. In particular, yet no allowance was made for 
depreciation, maintenance and repair. We also did not allow for inflation, and the analysis was 
confined to perfect capital markets and to a proportional tax. On the other hand, the chosen 
theoretical approach is quite general, integrating the problem in the broader context of optimal 
lifetime consumption choice. 
 
From a more general point of view, it could be doubted that equal taxing of owner-occupied 
dwellings and financial investments is desirable at all. There are many examples where the 
principle of equal taxing is violated and yet no one cares. For instance, the services which a 
housewife provides for her husband are left tax-free, whereas the same services, being bought 
on the market, have to bear a tax burden. Although this might lead to substantial 
misallocations from a pure economic point of view, no one would think on taxing private 
marriage duties. Other examples are the use of private cars in comparison with taking a taxi, 
providing for ones own garden instead of hiring a gardener or do it yourself rather than 
employing a craftsman. Therefore, it could reasonably be argued that the state should on 
principle not interfere into private self-services, which would also let the consumption good 
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